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I. CORRECTIVE JUSTICE
 The theories of civil recourse and corrective justice are so closely 
related that when Ben Zipursky was in Toronto several years ago 
presenting his paper Civil Recourse, Not Corrective Justice,1 I publicly 
asked him whether the word “not” in the title was a typo. Civil re-
course takes over the central insights of corrective justice: that the 
conceptual apparatus of tort law ought to be understood in its own 
terms rather than as a disguise for instrumental considerations; that 
tort law is not an operation of distributive justice; that tort liability is 
a response to wrongdoing; and that wrongs are violations of norms 
that relate the plaintiff and the defendant to each other. Although 
acknowledging their indebtedness to corrective justice (and indeed 
saluting it as “a major advance in modern interpretive tort theory”),2
John Goldberg and Ben Zipursky nonetheless have always insisted 
that civil recourse is significantly different.   
 In the Goldberg-Zipursky formulation, tort law provides a system 
of redress for those with substantive standing to sue wrongdoers who 
have injured them. Substantive standing, in turn, is given to anyone 
whose rights the defendant has violated. How is this redress distin-
guishable from the rectification of wrongs with which corrective jus-
tice is concerned? And if it is distinguishable, does it represent an 
advance over corrective justice in our understanding of tort law? 
 As I use the term, corrective justice is composed of three interwo-
ven strands.3 First, the relationship between the parties is structured 
by the correlativity of their normative positions as the doer and suf-
ferer of the same injustice. Second, this structure of correlativity is 
                                                           
?  University Professor and Cecil A. Wright Professor of Law, University of Toronto. 
I am grateful to Arthur Ripstein for discussion of an earlier version of this paper, and to 
participants in the University of Toronto’s Law and Philosophy Discussion Group (Peter 
Benson, Simone Chambers, Abraham Drassinower, Louis-Philippe Hodgson, Mark Migotti, 
Benny Porat, Arthur Ripstein, Hamish Stewart, and Jacob Weinrib) for discussion of an 
overlapping draft on remedies. 
 1.    Benjamin C. Zipursky, Civil Recourse, Not Corrective Justice, 91 GEO. L.J. 695 (2003). 
 2.    John C.P. Goldberg, Wrongs Without Recourse: A Comment on Jason Solomon’s
Judging Plaintiffs, 61 VAND. L. REV. EN BANC 9, 12 (2008).
 3.    ERNEST J. WEINRIB, THE IDEA OF PRIVATE LAW (1995) [hereinafter WEINRIB, PRI-
VATE LAW]; Ernest J. Weinrib, Corrective Justice in a Nutshell, 52 U. TORONTO L.J. 349 (2002). 
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expressed through the plaintiff’s right, conceived as a juridical 
manifestation of the plaintiff’s self-determining freedom in relation 
to others, and the defendant’s correlative duty. Third, those rights 
and duties are secured and enforced by public institutions, notably 
the courts, whose function is to articulate and apply grounds of liabil-
ity that accord with the parties’ correlative positions.  
 These three strands—the structural, the substantive, and the in-
stitutional—abstractly present the most pervasive features of private 
law as a familiar normative practice. Reasons for liability have a cor-
relative structure because the phenomenon of liability always corre-
lates a particular defendant and a particular plaintiff. The role of 
rights and duties reflects the role of the self-determining will in the 
creation, transformation, and termination of relationships of private 
law. Adjudication is the institutional means through which public 
reason elaborates and applies the norms of private law. Because cor-
rective justice treats the parties as equals within an integrated con-
ception of rights and remedies, it reveals what it means for private 
law to be both fair to the two parties and doctrinally coherent. And 
because every sophisticated system of private law aspires—of course, 
not always with success—to be fair and coherent, corrective justice 
both systemically informs such systems and provides the internal 
standpoint for criticizing their shortcomings. 
 Corrective justice, so understood, is a unifying theoretical concept. 
First, it integrates the positions of the plaintiff and the defendant. 
The injustice done by the defendant and suffered by the plaintiff 
forms a single juridical event in which each party participates only 
through the presence of the other. Accordingly, corrective justice re-
pudiates reasons for liability that are normatively relevant to either 
of the parties in isolation from the other—for example, the desirabil-
ity of the defendant being subject to economic incentives or the possi-
bility of the plaintiff insuring against loss. Instead, the liability is 
grounded on reasons that, by embracing both parties in their rela-
tionship, explicate the injustice between them.   
 Second, corrective justice integrates the injustice and its rectifica-
tion by construing the latter as undoing the former. The injustice is 
not an occasion for a court to do what is best, all things considered, 
given the present situation of the parties. Rather, even after it has 
occurred, the injustice remains the decisive feature in the parties’ 
relationship because the injustice to be corrected determines the 
available range of remedies that can correct it. What is rightfully the 
plaintiff’s is the subject matter both of the right and of the remedy—
the right entailing a duty of noninterference, the remedy a duty of 
restoration or reparation. Because what is rightfully the plaintiff’s 
remains constant throughout, the remedy is the continuation of the 
right; together they make up a single unbroken juridical sequence. In 
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postulating so intimate a relationship between right and remedy, 
corrective justice merely draws out what the law takes for granted. 
Long ago Learned Hand formulated this relationship as a truism 
when he characterized a remedy as “an obligation destined to stand 
in the place of the plaintiff’s rights, and be, as nearly as possible, an 
equivalent to him for his rights.”4 More recently, Peter Birks graph-
ically expressed the same sentiment when he remarked that a reme-
dy is “the same thing as the right, looked at from the other end.”5
 Broadly speaking, the supposed difference between civil recourse 
and corrective justice is that civil recourse accepts the first of these 
unifying features but rejects the second. Like corrective justice, civil 
recourse regards torts as relational wrongs in that their commission 
entails a relationship between the doer and the victim of the wrong.6
This focus on the parties’ relationship allows corrective justice and 
civil recourse to share a conception of tort law that is nondistributive, 
nonreductive, and noninstrumental. But civil recourse insists on the 
importance of distinguishing between the basis of the victim’s claim 
against the tortfeasor and the nature of the remedy to which the vic-
tim is entitled.7 “[T]he issue of whether there is a right of action . . . is 
distinct from the issue of what the remedy should be.”8 Goldberg and 
Zipursky view corrective justice’s account of the relationship of right 
and remedy not as integrating the components of a single normative 
sequence, but as “conflating”9 distinct levels of tort theory.  
 Accordingly, the controversy between corrective justice and civil 
recourse can be formulated as follows. Both approaches regard tort 
law (in the words that are thematic for a major Goldberg-Zipursky 
article) as the law of “wrongs and recourse.”10 The principal difference 
between the two lies in their divergent conceptions of the connection 
between wrong and remedy. For corrective justice, the plaintiff’s 
remedy is continuous with the right that the defendant infringed. For 
civil recourse, wrong and remedy are distinct. In other words, the ap-
parent disagreement about the law of “wrongs and recourse” concerns 
the meaning of the word “and.”  
 This Article maintains that the reasons that Goldberg and 
Zipursky offer for differentiating their approach from corrective jus-
tice are frail indeed. Taking up the theme of the connection of wrong 
                                                           
 4.    Learned Hand, Restitution or Unjust Enrichment, 11 HARV. L. REV. 249, 256 (1897). 
 5.    Peter Birks, Definition and Division: A Meditation on Institutes 3.13, in THE 
CLASSIFICATION OF OBLIGATIONS 1, 24 (Peter Birks ed., 1997).  
 6.    John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Torts as Wrongs, 88 TEX. L. REV.
917, 946 (2010). 
 7.    John C.P. Goldberg, Two Conceptions of Tort Damages: Fair V. Full Compensation,
55 DEPAUL L. REV. 435, 436 (2006); Zipursky, supra note 1, at 748. 
 8.    Zipursky, supra note 1, at 712. 
 9.    Benjamin C. Zipursky, Rights, Wrongs, and Recourse in the Law of Torts, 51 
VAND. L. REV. 1, 82 (1998). 
 10.   Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 6, at 918.   
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and remedy, the following section, Part II, sets out the corrective jus-
tice conception of remedies. The basic idea of this conception is that 
the remedy is the continuation of the right. As the normative marker 
of the parties’ relationship, the right survives the defendant’s wrong-
ing of it and lives on in the plaintiff’s entitlement to a remedy that is 
equivalent to it and limited by it. Part III considers several of the 
reasons that Goldberg and Zipursky provide for rejecting the correc-
tive justice view, including their observations that the remedy is 
available only at the plaintiff’s option and that the entitlement to the 
remedy is a power rather than a right. In response, Part III argues 
that the optional character of the remedy is itself a reflection of the 
continuity of the plaintiff’s right, for it is in the nature of a right that 
its holder can decide whether to invoke it. Moreover, the plaintiff’s 
power to sue for a remedy is merely a means of giving effect to an on-
going right, as is shown by the fact that the law regards the right as 
continuing even when the lapse of a limitation period extinguishes 
the power. Part IV then turns to the claim that the diversity of reme-
dies available to repair the wrong undercuts corrective justice. This 
claim is unsound. The diversity of remedies merely reflects the dif-
ferent ways in which the plaintiff’s right can be impaired and re-
stored. Part V explores a specific aspect of the claim about remedial 
diversity: the contention that its hostility to punitive damages makes 
corrective inferior to civil recourse as a theory of American tort law. 
Even aside from its theoretical parochialism, this contention is not 
well-founded, for the differences between corrective justice and civil 
recourse on this score are terminological rather than substantive. 
Finally, Part VI points out that Goldberg and Zipursky make the de-
fendant’s wrong determinative of who can sue and for what, thereby 
building into the wrong the limit on what the victim of wrongdoing 
can legitimately demand. Despite their protestations, this fundamen-
tal feature of civil recourse is the corrective justice position adopted 
for corrective justice reasons, though formulated in a distinctive way. 
Civil recourse, it turns out, is a version of, rather than an alternative 
to, corrective justice. In saying this I, of course, intend no criticism. 
To the contrary, the fact that civil recourse is a version of corrective 
justice constitutes its true strength.
II. RIGHT AND REMEDY
 On what grounds does corrective justice posit a continuity of right 
and remedy?11 This continuity flows from the mutually complemen-
                                                           
 11.    The continuity of right and remedy is explicit in German jurisprudence as the 
Rechtsfortsetzungsgedanke, the idea that “the injured right lives on in a claim for damages.” 
WALTER VAN GERVEN ET AL., COMMON LAW OF EUROPE CASEBOOKS: TORT LAW 753 (2000). 
The standard German legal textbook treats the idea of continuity as one aspect of—and 
therefore less comprehensive than—the idea of compensation (the Ausgleichsgedanke)
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tary ways in which corrective justice conceives of the structure and 
content of the private law relationship.12 The structure consists in the 
parties being correlatively situated as doer and sufferer of the same 
injustice. The content consists in the plaintiff’s having a right and 
the defendant’s being under a correlative duty, so that injustice oc-
curs on the defendant’s breach of a duty correlative to the plaintiff’s 
right. The continuity of the remedy reflects the persistence of this 
structure and content in the aftermath of the injustice.     
 This structure and content go to the reasons for holding a particu-
lar defendant liable to a particular plaintiff. As a matter of structure, 
the normative considerations that govern finding liability are those 
that implicate both parties in their relationship. As a matter of con-
tent, these considerations presuppose that the injury is to something 
to which the plaintiff has a right and with respect to which the de-
fendant is under a correlative duty. Being juridical manifestations of 
the parties’ self-determining freedom with respect to each other, 
right and duty are the ingredients, and not merely the conclusions, of 
legal argument about the terms of the parties’ interaction. The task 
of private law is to work out the meaning of these rights and duties 
so as to make them coherent with one another, reflective of the idea 
of self-determining freedom, and applicable to the myriad concrete 
situations of human interaction. 
 In correcting an injustice, the remedy has the same correlative 
structure as the relationship itself because a relational injustice can-
not be corrected nonrelationally. Accordingly, the remedy operates 
simultaneously against the defendant and in favor of the plaintiff. In 
an award of damages, for instance, the plaintiff is entitled to receive 
the very sum that the defendant is obligated to pay. If the law took 
money from the defendant without giving it to the plaintiff, the injus-
tice suffered by the plaintiff would remain uncorrected. Similarly, if 
the law gave money to the plaintiff without taking it from the de-
fendant, the injustice done by the defendant would remain uncorrect-
ed. Even if the law took money from the defendant and gave an 
equivalent amount of money to the plaintiff in separate operations 
(say, by requiring payment into one government fund and out of an-
other), the injustice as something done by the defendant to the plain-
tiff—and therefore as being of relational significance between them—
would still remain uncorrected. Structurally, the remedy is the mir-
                                                                                                                                        
because it views consequential damages as falling outside the idea of continuity. See, 
e.g., KARL LARENZ, 1 LEHRBUCH DES SCHULDRECHTS 424 (Verlag C.H. Beck ed., 14th ed. 
1987). The implication of my argument in this article is that, from the theoretical per-
spective, continuity is the more fundamental idea. On consequential damages, see infra
Part IV. 
 12.   For a discussion on this complementarity, see Ernest J. Weinrib, Correlativity, 
Personality, and the Emerging Consensus on Corrective Justice, 2 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES  
L. 107 (2001). 
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ror image of the injustice. Both feature the same movement from one 
pole of the relationship to the other, so that, to the extent possible, 
the relationship ends up as free of injustice as it was at the beginning.   
 The correction maintains not only the structure but also the content 
(the right and the correlative duty) of the parties’ relationship. What 
is correctively just about a private law relationship is the absence of 
breaches of any duty correlative to another’s right. Conversely, injus-
tice lies in an inconsistency with the plaintiff’s right that is imputable 
to the defendant. The point of the remedy is to eliminate this incon-
sistency. In this progression from justice to injustice and back again, 
the same right (and, of course, the same correlative duty) is the focus 
of the law’s attention. The right survives the injustice and continues 
into the remedy, which is nothing other than the judicially crystal-
lized post-injustice shape of the right.   
 Now, one might think that identifying the remedy with the pre-
injustice right (and its correlative duty) overstates the closeness of 
the connection between them. Suppose that the defendant has tor-
tiously destroyed an object belonging to the plaintiff and now has to 
pay the plaintiff a sum equal to the object’s value. Before the destruc-
tion, the defendant was under a duty to abstain from exposing the 
object to an unreasonable risk. After the destruction, the defendant 
cannot be under this duty because the object no longer exists. The 
action now required of the defendant is not abstention from creating 
an unreasonable risk, but transfer to the plaintiff of a certain sum of 
money. A duty mandates a specific action, and if the specific actions 
mandated are different, so are the duties.13
 A similar argument can be made on the rights side. A right gives 
its holder the freedom to act within its bounds. Yet the actions per-
mitted before the injustice may differ from those permitted after the 
injustice. For example, my right to bodily integrity cannot be alienat-
ed, but it may be possible for me, within restrictions set out by the 
positive law, to assign the damages claim that arises from the inju-
ry.14 The fact that after the injustice one has the freedom to do ac-
tions unavailable previously indicates (so the argument would go) 
that the different freedoms reflect different rights rather than the 
continuation of the same right. 
 That the variety of actions prohibited or permitted attests to a va-
riety of duties and rights is an appealing but misleading notion. It is 
not the case that if the specific actions mandated by the law are dif-
ferent, so are the legal duties. Different actions can be required by a 
single duty and a single action can be required by different duties. An 
                                                           
 13.    “[O]bligations . . . are individuated according to the action[s] that they make ob-
ligatory . . . .” John Gardner, What is Tort Law For? Part 1: The Place of Corrective Justice,
30 LAW & PHIL. 1, 29 (2011). 
 14.   I owe this example to Lionel Smith. 
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example of the latter is that the same specific action may be required 
both contractually and delictually. As for the former, suppose that 
the defendant, being under a duty of care as a bailee with respect to 
an object belonging to the plaintiff, was obliged both to keep his car 
locked as he transported the object and to water the object regularly. 
The law would regard these two different actions as different ways of 
fulfilling the same legal duty, not as the fulfillment of two different 
duties. The fact that there are innumerable ways in which a duty 
could be breached does not mean that each possible breach is the 
breach of a different duty.15   
 A legal duty takes its character from the legal category that in-
forms it, not from the specific action that it prohibits or requires. The 
same action required as a matter of both contract law and tort law is 
governed concurrently by two duties, one for each possible ground of 
liability. In my example of the bailment, the legal duty is that of a 
bailee, not that of a person who waters an object or transports it in a 
locked car.   
 Considered as a theoretical issue, the relation between right and 
remedy engages a still higher level of generality. Theory is concerned 
not with particular grounds of liability and their respective remedies, 
but with the nature of liability as such and the corresponding concep-
tion of a remedy. As noted above, under corrective justice the injus-
tice that gives rise to liability is an inconsistency with the plaintiff’s 
right that is imputable to the defendant. At its most general, having 
a right in private law means that the right-holder is normatively so 
connected to the object of the right that another person is under a 
duty not to interfere with that object.16 The legal system lays down 
the grounds for acquiring and holding rights of various sorts—offer 
and acceptance for contract, animus donandi and factum donandi for 
gift, and so on. As long as these grounds obtain, the relationship of 
right and duty continues regardless of what the defendant has done 
to the object of the right. Only actions consistent with the holder’s 
right can terminate this normative connection, as when property is 
alienated or a contract is discharged by performance. Conversely, the 
right (and the duty correlative to it) always survives an injustice, 
which by definition is an inconsistency with the right. 
 Accordingly, the defendant who, in breach of her duty, destroys an 
object belonging to the plaintiff does not thereby destroy the plain-
                                                           
 15.    The distinction between a duty and a required specific action tracks Kant’s ob-
scure distinction between an obligation (“the necessity of a free action under a categorical 
imperative of reason”) and a duty (“that action to which someone is bound. It is therefore 
the matter of obligation . . . .”) IMMANUEL KANT, THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 377 (Mary 
Gregor trans., 2d ed. 1996). Kant adds that “there can be one and the same duty (as to the 
action) although we can be bound to it in different ways.” Id.
 16.   “That is rightfully mine (meum iuris) with which I am so connected that another’s 
use of it without my consent would wrong me.” Id. at 401.  
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tiff’s right to the object. The plaintiff remains linked to the defendant 
through a right that pertains to the object as an undamaged thing. 
Although the defendant’s wrong has modified the physical condition 
of the object embodying the plaintiff’s right, the right remains intact 
as the normative marker of the relationship between them with re-
spect to that object. Even if the object no longer exists as a physical 
entity, the parties continue to be related to each other through the 
object’s normative connection to the plaintiff and the consequent duty 
on the defendant to act in conformity with that connection. Instead of 
being embodied in the object itself, the right and its correlative duty 
with respect to the object now take the form of an entitlement to have 
the defendant furnish the plaintiff with its value.   
 The survival of the right means that its correlative duty also sur-
vives. The defendant’s breach of duty did not, of course, end the duty 
with respect to the plaintiff’s right; for if it did, the duty—absurdly—
would have been discharged by its breach. To be sure, the specific 
action required of the defendant has been transformed by the de-
fendant’s tort. Just as the plaintiff’s right is no longer embodied in 
the specific object, which has been destroyed, but in an entitlement to 
receive the object’s equivalent from the defendant, so the defendant’s 
duty is no longer to abstain from its destruction, which has already 
taken place, but to provide the plaintiff with the object’s equivalent. 
The specific action that the duty requires is different, but the defend-
ant is not under a different duty. This is because, from a juridical 
point of view, what determines the nature of the duty is not the spe-
cific action that the duty requires, but the right to which the duty is 
correlative. And what determines the right is the appropriate norma-
tive connection between the object of the right and the person holding 
it. So long as that connection persists, the right and correlative duty 
with respect to the object remain.   
 Thus, the right and its correlative duty continue to exist with dif-
ferent specific content before and after the injustice. Underlying the 
succession of specific characteristics of the right and its correlative 
duty is the relationship that the parties have through the plaintiff’s 
connection with the object of the right. That relationship remains 
identical throughout the metamorphosis that the defendant’s injus-
tice has wrought in the object of the right. To put it in familiar philo-
sophical terms, the diachronic identity of the right is merely a juridi-
cal exemplification of the category of substance as that which persists 
through change: during the legal relationship the existence of the 
right remains constant, but the way in which the right exists chang-
es.17 Just as a person has different characteristics at different times 
                                                           
 17.     As Kant observed:  
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of life while yet remaining the same person, so a right and its correla-
tive duty have different characteristics at different points in their 
existence while yet remaining the same right and duty. From the ju-
ridical point of view, the parties do indeed step into the same river 
twice—or rather, despite the water’s rush, they stand in the same 
river continuously. 
 Blackstone (whom Goldberg and Zipursky often invoke) summed 
up the relation between right and remedy by stating that remedies 
“redress the party injured, by either restoring to him his right, if pos-
sible; or by giving him an equivalent.”18 Blackstone’s formulation is a 
paradigmatic expression of corrective justice. It implies three theses. 
The first is the thesis of identity, that the plaintiff’s injured right and 
the right restored by the defendant are the same right or its equiva-
lent. One cannot regard a right as being restored if it is other than 
the one the defendant wronged. The second is the thesis of limitation, 
that the remedy restores only the plaintiff‘s right and does not give 
the plaintiff more than that right (or its equivalent). Thus, the reason 
for creating liability also limits it.19 The third is the thesis of continu-
ity, that the plaintiff’s right survives the injury intact and continues 
to be the normative marker of the parties’ relationship. Because the 
right continues to exist, plaintiffs can justly apply to courts for the 
restoration of what remains rightfully theirs.20   
                                                                                                                                        
[I]n all appearances, the permanent is the object itself, that is, substance as 
phenomenon; everything, on the other hand, which changes or can change be-
longs only to the way in which substance or substances exist, and therefore to 
their determinations.   
I find that in all ages, not only philosophers, but even the common understand-
ing, have recognised this permanence as a substratum of all appearance, and 
always assume it to be indubitable.   
IMMANUEL KANT, CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON 214 (Norman Kemp Smith trans., rev. 2d ed., 
Palgrave MacMillan 2003) (1781). 
 18.    4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *7.   
 19.   For this idea in a related context see Warren A. Seavey, Mr. Justice Cardozo and 
the Law of Torts, 39 COLUM. L. REV. 20, 34-35 (1939). 
 20.   Blackstone’s terminology of restoring the plaintiff’s right is not entirely felicitous, 
as it participates in the ambiguity of right as both something that a plaintiff has and a 
normative status that attaches to something that the plaintiff has. One should not think 
that the very description of the remedy as the restoration of a right shows that the plaintiff 
did not have what the remedy restores. Kant drew attention to this terminological impreci-
sion in his discussion of external right. In Kantian terms, ownership involves possessing an 
object intellectually rather than empirically because the essence of ownership is that it 
persists even when the owner is not in physical possession of the thing owned. For this 
reason, he writes, “it is not appropriate to speak of possessing a right to this or that object 
but rather of possessing it merely rightfully; for a right is already an intellectual pos-
sess[ing] of an object and it would make no sense to speak of possessing a possessing.” 
KANT, supra note 15, at 71. In the same way, here the wrong is a deprivation of what is 
rightfully the plaintiff’s and the remedy restores to the plaintiff what is rightfully hers. For 
an illuminating treatment of remedies from a Kantian perspective, see Arthur Ripstein, As 
If It Had Never Happened, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1957 (2007).   
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 These three theses are interrelated. Rights could not be enjoyed as 
domains of freedom unless the law secured them against wrongs by 
requiring wrongdoers to restore what they have injured (the identity 
thesis). However, because the relationship between the parties is one 
of equal freedom, the plaintiff’s freedom does not entitle the court to 
coerce the defendant into providing the plaintiff with a windfall over 
and above the restored right, for that, in turn, would be inconsistent 
with the defendant’s freedom (the limitation thesis).21 With the ideas 
of injury and restoration in place, one might wonder how the tem-
poral gap between them is normatively bridged. One might suppose 
that the occurrence of the injury puts an end to the plaintiff’s right, 
leaving the plaintiff without a basis for claiming what she no longer 
has. Perhaps all that the plaintiff can expect is an apology for the 
misfortune that the defendant caused.22 The continuity thesis holds, 
in reply, that even after the injury the plaintiff continues to have the 
right to what was wrongly injured. From the normative point of view, 
no gap in the plaintiff’s right-holding exists between the injury and 
the remedy.        
III.   OBJECTIONS
 Opposed to the argument just laid out is the insistence by Gold-
berg and Zipursky that the right and the remedy raise distinct issues 
that corrective justice improperly conflates. Zipursky has raised 
three particular objections to the identity of right and remedy under 
corrective justice.23 Running parallel to these particular objections is 
the contention by Goldberg and Zipursky that, in the interval between 
the occurrence of the wrong and the court’s issuance of a remedy, the 
plaintiff holds a power and not a right.24 This power thereby interrupts 
the continuity of right-holding that corrective justice postulates.   
 I turn first to Zipursky’s particular objections. Zipursky writes, 
“First, it is highly implausible that one is discharging the duty to re-
frain from wrongdoing someone by compensating her ex post for the 
                                                           
 21.   As Kant observed in his comment about tort law: 
I cannot acquire a right against another through a deed of his that is contrary 
to right, (facto iniusto alterius); for even if he has wronged me and I have a 
right to demand compensation from him, by this I will still only preserve what 
is mine undiminished but will not acquire more than what I previously had. 
KANT, supra note 15, at 422. 
 22.   See Stephen R. Perry, Loss, Agency, and Responsibility for Outcomes: Three 
Conceptions of Corrective Justice, in TORT THEORY 24 (Ken Cooper-Stephenson & Elaine 
Gibson eds., 1993). 
 23.   Zipursky, supra note 9, at 73-74. 
 24.   Zipursky, supra note 1, at 718-33. Goldberg and Zipursky usually formulate this 
from the defendant’s side rather than the plaintiff’s: the defendant is under a liability ra-
ther than a duty to repair. Id. 
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harm she has suffered in consequence of being wronged.”25 It is, in-
deed, highly implausible; fortunately, the argument that Zipursky is 
criticizing does not suggest it. The continuity of right and remedy 
means that the same relationship of right and duty continues 
through a sequence of stages that, on the duty side, require different 
specific actions. A sequence is not a smorgasbord from which the de-
fendant can mix and match. What counts as the discharge of the duty 
in any given stage is determined by the actions that the duty calls for 
at that stage, not at a previous or subsequent one.  
 Accordingly, the defendant cannot satisfy the duty as it existed at 
one stage by performing the action called for at a subsequent stage. 
As a juridical instantiation of the category of substance,26 the right 
and its correlative duty persist through change; they do not remain 
unchanged. Just as my being a more mature version of the person I 
was as a child does not now require me to enroll in kindergarten, 
so the defendant who has committed an injustice can no longer satis-
fy his duty in its original form. The wrong committed earlier remains a 
wrong. The remedy vindicates the plaintiff’s right by restoring 
what is rightfully his, thereby affirming rather than denying that 
the wrong occurred. Because the defendant’s wrong is a breach of the 
duty owed to the plaintiff, the duty continues to exist in a new form 
that requires the performance appropriate to this new stage of the 
parties’ relationship.   
 “Second, Weinrib’s account does not explain why a tortfeasor 
might not owe a duty of repair even to those whose right was not vio-
lated.”27 This objection challenges the significance of the plaintiff’s 
right to begin with, rather than the notion that the remedy is contin-
uous with that right. That liability is concerned with injuries to 
rights rather than with harms has long been a tenet of corrective 
justice.28 As explained earlier, corrective justice views the parties’ 
relationship as structured by the correlativity of their normative po-
sitions as doer and sufferer of the same injustice. The correlative 
structure of reasons for liability requires the employment of concepts 
that are themselves correlative. Right and duty are the requisite cor-
relative concepts. Private law, therefore, recognizes no duty on the 
defendant that is not correlative to the plaintiff’s right. Hence, the 
violation of a right is necessary for the duty to repair. 
 “Third, and more generally, Weinrib appears to be mixing catego-
ries. The question of how one is obligated to conduct oneself toward 
another is different from the question of what one ought to do if one 
                                                           
 25.  Zipursky, supra note 9, at 74. 
 26.    KANT, supra note 17. 
 27.  Zipursky, supra note 9, at 74. 
 28.    In contemporary tort theory the earliest adumbration was in Ernest J. Weinrib, 
Right and Advantage in Private Law, 10 CARDOZO L. REV. 1283 (1989). 
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harms another through breach of that obligation.”29 Of course, the 
specific action required of the defendant before and after the wrong is 
different. But the issue is whether the different actions required at 
these two stages comprise a single normative sequence in which the 
defendant’s duty is continuously correlative to the plaintiff’s ongoing 
right. Contrary to Zipursky’s assumption, this issue is not affected by 
the Austinian distinction between a primary duty and the secondary 
duty that arises out of a violation of a primary duty.30 That distinc-
tion merely sets out different stages in the parties’ relationship; it 
does not address the nature of the normative connection between them.   
 So much for those particular criticisms. I now turn to the more 
general reason that Goldberg and Zipursky have for denying that the 
remedy is continuous with the right. They emphasize that tort law 
leaves correction of the wrong to the initiative, and thus to the op-
tion, of the plaintiff.31 For them this is the key structural characteris-
tic of tort law: it empowers the injured party to seek civil recourse 
without otherwise imposing a duty to repair on the wrongdoer. The 
consequence of the plaintiff’s having the option to seek civil recourse 
is that the parties’ relationship on the commission of a wrong is 
marked by the correlativity of power and liability, not right and duty.   
 This leads to two interconnected criticisms of corrective justice. 
The first criticism is that, inasmuch as corrective justice holds that 
the wrongdoer is under a duty to repair, it cannot explain the option-
ality of the plaintiff’s recourse. If the point of tort law is to operate as 
corrective justice, and if the corrective justice imposes a duty to re-
pair, then why does the legal system not insist that wrongdoers per-
form their duty? The second criticism is that if the plaintiff has a 
power and not a right (and, correspondingly, the defendant is under a 
liability and not under a duty), then the occurrence of the wrong cre-
ates an interval during which the plaintiff has no right, thereby in-
terrupting the continuity of the right into the remedy. Whereas cor-
rective justice conceptualizes the plaintiff’s suit as the attempt to en-
force an existing right, civil recourse denies that there is any right for 
the plaintiff to enforce. Instead, the plaintiff is merely exercising a 
power to apply to the court to create a new right.  
 In making these criticisms, the theory of civil recourse goes seri-
ously off the rails. First, under corrective justice no mystery attends 
the plaintiff’s option to seek a remedy. The defendant’s duty to repair 
as a matter of corrective justice is not freestanding; it is always cor-
relative to a right of the plaintiff. A right, in turn, gives its holder an 
area of freedom with respect to the subject matter of the right. One 
                                                           
 29.  Zipursky, supra note 9, at 74. 
 30.   2 JOHN AUSTIN, LECTURES ON JURISPRUDENCE 764 (Robert Campbell, ed. 5th 
ed. 1885). 
 31.   John C.P. Goldberg, Twentieth-Century Tort Theory, 91 GEO. L.J. 513, 577 (2003). 
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aspect of this freedom is that it is up to the right-holder to determine 
whether to insist on her right, rather than abandon it, waive it, or 
ignore its violations. The optional character of the plaintiff’s recourse 
simply reflects—indeed continues—this feature of the plaintiff’s 
right. Accordingly, because corrective justice is a system of rights, 
tort law operates as corrective justice precisely by making the pursuit 
of recourse for the right’s violation optional for the right-holder.   
 Second, the fact that the injured party has a power to sue the 
wrongdoer does not imply that the plaintiff lacks a right. To the con-
trary, in many private law contexts the power to sue is intelligible 
only as a means of giving effect to an already existing right. For ex-
ample, the power to sue in nuisance for an injunction gives effect to 
the plaintiff’s ongoing right to the use and enjoyment of the property. 
The same is true if, instead of suing in nuisance for an injunction, the 
plaintiff makes a claim for future damages. In such cases the exist-
ence of the power to sue does not entail an interruption in the conti-
nuity of the plaintiff’s right during the interval between the wrong 
and the issuance of the remedy. 
 What about the more common instances, including liability for 
negligence, where the defendant’s breach of duty is a past event ra-
ther than a continuing activity? Does the Goldberg-Zipursky argu-
ment apply at least in this kind of case? Unfortunately for their the-
sis, even in such instances the law does not conceptualize the power 
to sue as unaccompanied by an ongoing right. This is evident from 
the fact that the law treats the plaintiff’s right as existing even when 
the plaintiff no longer has the power to sue. Consider the traditional 
common law doctrine that the lapse of a limitation period bars the 
remedy, but does not extinguish the right.32 This doctrine presuppos-
es that the injured plaintiff’s power to sue is the means of enforcing 
an already existing right, not (as Goldberg and Zipursky claim) that 
the injured plaintiff no longer has a right until the exercise of the 
power creates a fresh one. Identifying the right to which the doctrine 
about limitation periods refers seems to pose an insoluble problem for 
the Goldberg-Zipursky argument. The right in question cannot refer 
to the prospect of recovering damages through the plaintiff’s exercise 
of the power to sue, because that prospect is precisely what the limi-
tations period does extinguish. Nor can the right (and its correlative 
duty) refer to what they might be tempted to call “moral” rather than 
“legal” considerations;33 the right has sufficient legal character to 
play a role in other legal contexts, such as grounding a claim for con-
                                                           
 32.   Higgins v. Scott, (1831) 109 Eng. Rep. 1196 (K.B.) 1197; 2 B. & Ad. 413, 414-15; 
Quantock v. England, (1770) 98 Eng. Rep. 382 (K.B.) 383; 5 Burr 2628, 2629-30. 
 33.   Zipursky recognizes that the wrongdoer may well be under a duty to pay even in 
the absence of a judgment, but he ascribes this duty to moral not legal considerations. 
Zipursky, supra note 1, at 721-24.  
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tribution among tortfeasors34 or preventing a claim in unjust enrich-
ment for payment made after the limitation period passed. Thus, the 
contention that only a power (and not a right) exists during the in-
terval between the wrong and the judgment fails to account for a 
plaintiff’s postlimitation rights. For how can the plaintiff have unex-
tinguished a right that in their view no longer exists?   
 In sum, none of the Goldberg-Zipursky objections succeed against 
the corrective justice notion that the remedy is a continuation of the 
right. Zipursky has said that what corrective justice needs is “an ex-
planation of how breach of a duty is connected to the obligation to 
repair harm done by that breach.”35 The continuity thesis furnishes 
that explanation. Provided that the harm is a wrongful injury to the 
plaintiff’s right, the obligation to repair requires the wrongdoer to 
correct that injustice by restoring the very right that was wrongly 
injured. The connection is the closest possible: the original duty and 
the duty to repair are successive moments within a single relation-
ship of right and duty.36
IV.   THE DIVERSITY OF REMEDIES
 In addition to these objections, Goldberg and Zipursky also criti-
cize corrective justice for being unable to account for the diversity of 
the remedies that the law makes available. The argument that they 
offer in support of this claim is remarkably sparse. It consists of little 
more than a list of remedies (injunctions, nominal damages, conse-
quential damages, and so on) accompanied by the assertion that the 
diversity of the list’s components undercuts corrective justice.37 The 
assumption seems to be that a single conception of justice could not 
account for a plurality of remedies. Perhaps this assumption reflects 
the mistaken notion that positing the singleness of anything pre-
cludes its being internally differentiated, as if a single human body 
could not have a diversity of limbs and organs.   
 Be that as it may, the assumption that the diversity of remedies 
undercuts corrective justice is without foundation. Corrective justice 
is a normative regime of rights and their correlative duties. In 
awarding a remedy, the law aims to remove the inconsistency with 
                                                           
 34.   Owners, Strata Plan LMS 1751 v. Scott Mgmt. Ltd., 2010 BCCA 192, para. 57-58 
(Can.); MacKenzie v. Vance, (1977) 74 D.L.R. 3d 383, 394-95 (Can. N.S. S.C. App. Div.).  
 35.   Zipursky, supra note 9, at 74. 
 36.    Goldberg and Zipursky often say that civil recourse simply reflects the ancient 
maxim ubi jus ibi remedium (“where there is a right, there is a remedy”). Goldberg & 
Zipursky, supra note 6, at 973. For what it is worth, strictly speaking, that is not the case. 
It is rather corrective justice that reflects this maxim because corrective justice preserves 
the continuity of the right to which the maxim attests. For civil recourse, the maxim would 
have to be the less snappy ubi jus olim fuit ibi remedium erit (“where there was once a 
right, there will be a remedy”). 
 37.   Zipursky, supra note 1, at 710-12. 
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the plaintiff’s rights by having the defendant restore what is rightful-
ly the plaintiff’s. The diversity of the remedies reflects the different 
ways of impairing and restoring what is rightfully the plaintiff’s.   
 Restoring the plaintiff’s right can take two forms: the qualitative 
and the quantitative. The qualitative form restores to the plaintiff 
the very thing that is the subject matter of the right, thereby allowing 
the plaintiff to have and enjoy “its specific qualitative character.”38 In 
such cases the law gives specific relief, such as specific delivery of a 
unique or unusual chattel, specific performance of a contractual obli-
gation, or an injunction against a private nuisance or trespass. The 
quantitative form restores to the plaintiff, through an award of dam-
ages, the monetary equivalent of the injury. One of the tasks of the 
law of remedies, of course, is to work out which of these forms of 
restoring the plaintiff’s right is available in what circumstances—an 
issue that different jurisdictions handle in different ways. Nonethe-
less, in accordance with corrective justice, both forms of restoration 
exemplify the continuity of right and remedy. 
 Why might one think, as Goldberg and Zipursky do, that the 
availability of injunctive relief undermines corrective justice? Their 
idea seems to be that an injunction against future wrongdoing ap-
plies when there is yet no wrong to correct, whereas corrective justice 
operates only retrospectively.39 This, however, misconceives correc-
tive justice. Under corrective justice, the private law relationship is 
correlatively structured by the plaintiff’s right and the defendant’s 
duty. The remedy instantiates that structure by vindicating the 
plaintiff’s right against the defendant’s breach of the correlative duty. 
What matters is not the temporal relation between the injustice and 
the remedy, but the structure of the injustice and the consequent struc-
ture of the remedy. For instance, if (as I have argued elsewhere)40 the 
norms against nuisances instantiate corrective justice, then so do the 
injunctions that prevent nuisances. Thus, corrective justice operates 
not only by requiring the defendant to repair a wrong once it has oc-
curred, but also by granting the plaintiff an injunction that prevents 
the defendant from extending the wrong into the future.41    
 The continuity of right and remedy also holds for the various 
kinds of damages that figure in the quantitative form of restoration: 
substitutive damages, nominal damages, consequential damages, 
gain-based damages, and aggravated damages. Consider each of the-
se in turn.  
                                                           
 38.   G.W.F. HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT 69 (T.M. Knox trans., Claredon Press 1942). 
 39.   Andrew S. Gold, A Moral Rights Theory of Private Law, 52 WM. & MARY L. REV.
1873, 1892 (2011). 
 40.   WEINRIB, PRIVATE LAW, supra note 3, at 190-96. 
 41.   Id. at 144. 
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 First, the right-holder is entitled to the physical integrity of the 
thing that forms the subject matter of the right.42 Correspondingly, 
others are under a duty not to wrongfully interfere with that physical 
integrity. When such interference occurs, the right-holder’s entitle-
ment to an intact thing continues as against the wrongdoer. The 
wrongdoer then has a correlative duty to transfer the sum of money 
that leaves the right-holder with the equivalent of the thing’s value 
in its intact state. Such damages have been termed “substitutive,” in 
that they are awarded to the plaintiff as a substitute for the right 
that the defendant infringed.43
 Second, when a right is infringed without impairing the physical 
condition of the object, a court awards nominal damages. The availa-
bility of nominal damages is the remedial affirmation that private 
law vindicates rights and does not merely repair losses. Just as no 
liability follows when a loss is not the wrongful infringement of a 
right, so conversely can a defendant be held liable, and required to 
pay nominal damages, for a wrong to the plaintiff’s right that does 
not occasion a loss. The obligation to pay nominal damages is the 
continuation of the defendant’s duty not to interfere with the plain-
tiff’s right even when no loss results from such interference. 
 Third, the right-holder’s entitlement to have the thing physically 
intact carries with it an entitlement to use the thing in its intact con-
dition for his or her purposes. Accordingly, a wrongful interference 
with the thing’s physical integrity may wrongfully interfere with the 
use, actual or prospective, to which the right-holder is putting or is 
likely to put the intact thing. The entitlement to use the intact 
thing imports a correlative duty not to wrongfully interfere with such 
use. This duty finds its remedial continuation is what the law terms 
“consequential” damages, that is, the monetary sum equivalent to 
the worth of the use of which the defendant wrongly deprived the 
right-holder. 
 Fourth, the right-holder has an exclusive entitlement to deal with 
the thing owned and can realize the thing’s value by charging for its 
use or by selling it. The gain from the use or the sale is as much the 
right-holder’s as is the thing itself. Accordingly, the right-holder can 
claim restitution of such a gain from a wrongdoer who made it 
through a use or a sale that was unauthorized. This award of gain-based 
damages (and its historical antecedent in “waiver of tort”) is the con-
tinuation of the right-holder’s entitlement to the thing’s value.44        
                                                           
 42.   For purposes of exposition I assume a wrong with respect to a corporeal object. 
The argument would not essentially change for non-corporeal objects, though it would be 
reformulated to accord with the non-corporeal nature of the subject matter of the right.  
 43.   ROBERT STEVENS, TORTS AND RIGHTS 60 (2007). 
 44.   Ernest J. Weinrib, Restitutionary Damages as Corrective Justice, 1 THEORETICAL 
INQUIRIES L. 1, 2-3 (2000). 
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 Fifth, the common law recognizes that a wrongdoer may not only 
have injured the object of the right, but may also have done this so 
high-handedly as to injure the dignity of the right-holder. To com-
pensate for such injuries to dignity the law awards aggravated dam-
ages, for a court may “take into account the motives and conduct of 
the defendant [when] they aggravate the injury done to the plain-
tiff.”45 This form of damages reflects the connection between the ob-
ject of the right and the dignity that the law ascribes to the right-
holder. As a system of rights, the law presupposes a distinction 
between persons (entities imbued with the dignity that attends the 
capacity for rights) and things (entities devoid of that dignity). The 
dignity that comes from the right-holder’s connection to the object of 
the right is as much within the entitlement of the right-holder as the 
object of the right itself. Accordingly, the law awards additional dam-
ages, which it regards as compensatory, for a wrong committed in a 
way that imparts injury to the right-holder’s dignity over and above 
the injury done to the object of the right itself. Such damages are the 
continuation of the dignity inherent in being the right-holder.46   
 Thus, it is a mistake to think that the diversity of the available 
remedies undermines the corrective justice account. To the contrary, 
one of the strengths of the corrective justice approach is that, 
through the robust role that it assigns to rights and their correlative 
duties, it provides a unifying framework for the different remedies. 
The different kinds of damages reflect the various kinds of entitle-
ment that a right gives, including an entitlement to the intactness of 
the object of the right, to its use and value as an intact object, to its 
inviolability even in the absence of loss, and to the dignity that at-
taches to the right-holder. The distinction between monetary damag-
es and specific remedies such as injunctions reflects the different 
ways in which the injured right can be restored. 
V. PUNITIVE DAMAGES
 In discussing the various kinds of damages, I omitted punitive 
damages, to which I now turn. Regarding this class of damages, 
Zipursky claims that civil recourse has a clear advantage over correc-
tive justice. Given the propensity of corrective justice to explain all 
damages awards as compensatory, Zipursky argues, corrective 
justice cannot account for the role that punitive damages—
noncompensatory by definition—play in the actual operation of 
                                                           
 45.   Rookes v. Barnard, [1964] A.C. 1129 (H.L.) at 1221 (Eng.). 
 46.   On aggravated damages as reparation for injury to dignity, see Allan Beever, The 
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American tort law.47 This Part points out the infirmities in this su-
perficially attractive argument. 
 Punitive damages are indeed inconsistent with corrective justice 
for reasons both of structure and of content. So far as structure is 
concerned, corrective justice requires that the normative considera-
tions applicable to the relationship between plaintiff and defendant 
reflect the parties’ correlative standing as doer and sufferer of the 
same injustice. Accordingly, it excludes considerations that refer to 
one of the parties without encompassing the correlative situation of 
the other. The standard justifications for punitive damages—
deterrence and retribution—are one-sided considerations that focus 
not relationally on the parties as doer and sufferer of the same injus-
tice, but unilaterally on the defendant (and anyone else who might be 
similarly situated) as doer. The place of such considerations is not 
private law but criminal law, because criminal law is concerned not 
with whether the accused has injured someone’s particular right, but 
with whether the accused has acted inconsistently with the existence 
of a regime of rights in general.48 In effect, punitive damages function 
as a defendant-financed reward for acting as a private prosecutor 
while subjecting the defendant to punishment without the protec-
tions of the criminal law.   
 So far as content is concerned, punitive damages are inconsistent 
with the role of rights in corrective justice. Punitive damages do not 
restore to plaintiffs what is rightfully theirs, but instead give them a 
windfall. Thus, punitive damages based on deterrence and retribu-
tion violate what I earlier termed the limitation thesis: the remedy 
should only restore the plaintiff’s right and not give the plaintiff 
more than that right (or its equivalent).   
 To the extent, then, that punitive damages depend on considera-
tions of retribution and deterrence, Zipursky’s contention that correc-
tive justice does not account for an important feature of American 
tort law is well grounded. However, Zipursky should feel little sense 
of triumph about this. 
 First, Zipursky and Goldberg of all people can hardly regard the 
rejection of deterrence-based punitive damages as a failure of correc-
tive justice. The embarrassing fact is that their theory also does not 
account for this feature of contemporary American tort law, as they 
frankly acknowledge.49 Their difficulty is that punitive damages that 
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aim at deterrence and retribution are not oriented toward redressing 
a wrong suffered by the plaintiff. The consequence is that the puni-
tive damages act as a bounty for achieving public policy goals within 
the context of litigation by a single plaintiff, thereby giving rise to 
significant procedural concerns.50 In other words, Zipursky and Gold-
berg think that punitive damages of this sort have the very problems 
that corrective justice ascribes to them.   
 Second, the differing theoretical objectives of the two approaches 
means that a lack of fit with American tort law creates a difficulty for 
civil recourse that is absent from corrective justice. Goldberg and 
Zipursky, naturally enough, present civil recourse mainly as a theory 
of American tort law, even to the extent of chastising corrective jus-
tice for not dealing with the role of the civil jury, “that important fea-
ture of American practice.”51 This preoccupation with American tort 
law is also evident in their lack of interest in legal systems that share 
corrective justice’s antipathy to punitive damages, such as the law of 
Germany and (to a lesser extent) England.52 Accordingly, the lack of 
congruence between the Goldberg-Zipursky theory and the operation 
of punitive damages in American law undermines their theory from 
their own point of view.   
 In contrast, corrective justice is not a theory of American tort law 
as such. Rather, it explicates the internal structure and presupposi-
tions of the private law relationship, as found in sophisticated legal 
systems, in order to present at a high level of abstraction what it 
means for private law to be fair and coherent on its own terms. Be-
cause sophisticated systems of private law strive—not always with 
success, of course—to be fair and coherent, they are composed of 
norms that might exhibit the specific meaning of corrective justice for 
a particular legal system or legal tradition. Conversely, corrective 
justice provides an internal standpoint for the criticism of norms that 
are not consonant with a liability regime’s own aspiration to fairness 
and coherence. Accordingly, if the corrective justice arguments 
against the American practice of punitive damages are sound, then 
corrective justice has fulfilled its theoretical function of providing the 
internal standpoint for identifying unfair or incoherent doctrine. Un-
like civil recourse, corrective justice is unaffected by the fact that this 
particular feature of American legal practice does not conform to it. 
 In the Goldberg-Zipursky treatment of punitive damages, the real 
contest between civil recourse and corrective justice concerns a dif-
ferent kind of punitive damage award than that which aims at deter-
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rence. They point out that in American tort law, punitive damages 
can also operate as a mechanism for punishing wrongs that are par-
ticularly egregious because the defendant’s conduct was wanton or 
willful. Punitive damages of this sort “refer to the plaintiff’s entitle-
ment to vindication in light of the nature of the wrong done. By defi-
nition, we are not dealing with compensation here, so corrective jus-
tice theory is inapt.”53 In their view, the effort by corrective justice 
theory to reduce punitive damages of this sort to a special form of 
compensatory damages is inconsistent with the way the law concep-
tualizes them. This reduction is “an attempt not to explain, but to 
explain away.”54
 Here again, Goldberg and Zipursky are the prisoners of their pre-
occupation with American tort law. They correctly note in passing 
that punitive damages of this sort are known to other jurisdictions 
as “aggravated damages,”55 but they do not follow through on what 
this observation implies. The idea of aggravated damages was first 
formulated in the English jurisprudence that restricted punitive 
damages to the minimum scope consistent with precedent.56 Aggra-
vated damages were held to be not punitive but compensatory. Even 
in Commonwealth jurisdictions (such as Canada) that reject the Eng-
lish approach to punitive damages, the idea that aggravated damages 
are not punitive but compensatory continues to prevail. As set out in 
Part IV of this Article, aggravated damages compensate, in accord-
ance with corrective justice, for the injury that high-handed wrongdo-
ing does to the plaintiff’s dignity. There is no “attempt to explain 
away” here: Corrective justice takes aggravated damages as the law 
presents them—as a response to the dignitary aggravation of a 
wrong—and situates these damages within the conception of rights 
with which corrective justice operates. Only if one thinks that Ameri-
can law is the only theoretically significant body of law can one criti-
cize the corrective justice approach to high-handed wrongdoing as 
reductive. In other words, the Goldberg-Zipursky argument depends 
on its premise that, “by definition, we are not dealing with compensa-
tion here,”57 a definition that is merely a fiat of American law as they 
understand it.   
 Compared to corrective justice, the Goldberg-Zipursky treatment 
of punitive damages accomplishes little. It distinguishes damages 
that are oriented to deterrence from damages that are geared to wan-
ton and willful wrongdoing. The latter sort of damages, unlike the 
former, are not properly described as an individual’s usurpation of 
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the state’s power to punish.58 In the American context, where both 
sorts of damages are covered by the same term, this may be a signifi-
cant insight. However, it is not news to corrective justice, which re-
flects the usage of Commonwealth legal systems that distinguish 
these two kinds of damages even in their nomenclature. 
 In fact, aside from nomenclature, the difference between the ag-
gravated damages of corrective justice and the punitive damages of 
civil recourse is hard to discern. Perhaps this is why Goldberg and 
Zipursky can so casually acknowledge that punitive damages are 
known elsewhere as aggravated damages. Goldberg and Zipursky 
explain their approved species of punitive damages as a response to 
the victimization that attends wanton wrongdoing. This victimization 
enhances the wrong, thereby making it legitimate for the victim to 
claim greater damages than would be allowed for wrongdoing that 
lacked the dimension of wantonness. For corrective justice, victimiza-
tion involves an injury to dignity because the manner in which the 
wrongdoer violates the victim’s right implies that the victim is a 
mere thing that lacks the dignity of a right-holder. Both approaches 
regard the manner in which the wrong is committed as having a rela-
tional significance that properly entitles the victim to claim a higher 
level of damages from the tortfeasor. Because jurisdictions that ac-
cord with corrective justice identify the wrong as an injury to dignity, 
they regard the damage award as compensating for this injury. Civil 
recourse, in contrast, looks at the process of wrongdoing without 
identifying what is thereby injured. Consequently, it regards the 
damage award as noncompensatory. Nothing substantial is at stake 
in this divergence. Both approaches ascribe the same consequences to 
the same behavior for the same reasons.59     
VI.   CIVIL RECOURSE IS CORRECTIVE JUSTICE
 What has come of the efforts of Goldberg and Zipursky to distin-
guish civil recourse from corrective justice? In this Article I have 
elaborated the corrective justice conception of remedies and respond-
ed to several points of claimed difference. I have argued that 
Zipursky’s particular objections to the continuity thesis fail, that 
Goldberg and Zipursky are mistaken in thinking that corrective jus-
tice cannot explain the optional nature of the plaintiff’s recourse, that 
they are also mistaken in regarding the diversity of remedies as un-
dermining corrective justice, and that the corrective justice account of 
                                                           
 58.   Zipursky, Punitive Damages, supra note 47, at 153. 
 59.    Perhaps because they cannot anchor the punitive damage award in injury to an 
aspect of the plaintiff’s right, Goldberg and Zipursky make presumed psychological reac-
tions (the plaintiff’s feeling of outrage or grievance, and consequent ideas of revenge or 
retaliation) salient in their account of punitive damages. Corrective justice does not share 
this reduction of the juridical to the psychological.    
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punitive damages is at least as illuminating as that of civil recourse. 
In none of these respects have Goldberg and Zipursky formulated 
viable grounds for favorably distinguishing their approach from 
corrective justice. 
 Aside from these criticisms of corrective justice, Goldberg and 
Zipursky claim that in the interval between the commission of the 
wrong and the issuance of a remedy the plaintiff has only a power 
and not a right. They regard this as a cornerstone of their approach 
and as their unique insight into the normative character of tort 
claims. In contrast, corrective justice argues for a position it regards 
both as more plausible in itself and as more consonant with the law: 
The power to sue and the resultant remedy enforce an existing right.   
 I want to suggest, in conclusion, that the reason that it is so hard 
to locate a sound and viable difference between corrective justice and 
civil recourse is that, at bottom, the latter is merely a version of the 
former. Of course, it is always the case that different versions of the 
same basic theoretical position vary in their formulations, emphases, 
and nuances. But the root question is whether the approaches differ 
significantly in their understanding of the most fundamental fea-
tures of tort liability: the wrong and its connection to the remedy. 
Given that civil recourse follows the lead of corrective justice in con-
ceiving wrongs as relational, the only possible difference of any sig-
nificance between the two approaches hinges on how they conceptual-
ize the connection of the wrong to the remedy.   
 The central theoretical question about remedies is this: Does the 
wrong stand to the remedy as a condition or as a reason?60 The wrong 
is a condition of the remedy when its occurrence triggers the availa-
bility of a remedy without determining the remedy’s scope. When this 
happens, the remedy actualizes considerations that are independent 
of, and even inconsistent with, the wrong. One example of this is the 
now discredited remoteness rule in England that the defendant is 
liable for all the unforeseeable but direct consequences of a negligent 
act on the ground that culpability is one thing, compensation another.61
A more extreme example is the indemnified injunction for a nuisance, 
which requires the victim of the wrong to compensate the perpetrator 
for the inconvenience caused by the remedy.62 When the wrong is 
merely its condition, the remedy can be geared to forms of what 
Goldberg and Zipursky call loss allocation (loss distribution, economic 
efficiency, deterrence, and so on)63 that do not figure in the reasons 
for considering the defendant’s action to have been wrongful. 
                                                           
 60.    Ernest J. Weinrib, Two Conceptions of Remedies, in JUSTIFYING PRIVATE LAW 
REMEDIES 3, 3 (Charles EF Rickett ed., 2008). 
 61.    See, e.g., In re Polemis & Furness, Withy & Co., [1921] 3 K.B. 560 (C.A.). 
 62.    See Spur Indus. v. Del E. Webb Dev. Co., 494 P.2d 700, 708 (Ariz. 1972). 
 63.    Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 6, at 927. 
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 In contrast, the wrong is the reason for the remedy when the rea-
son for regarding something as a wrong is also the sole reason for the 
law’s awarding a remedy, and thus the sole determinant of the reme-
dy’s scope. Because the remedy cannot go beyond the reason for its 
existence, the remedy’s structure and content are defined by the 
structure and content of the wrong. Consequently, the injustice to be 
remedied determines what is to be included in the award that reme-
dies it. Conversely, a normative consideration that is irrelevant to 
the wrong cannot figure within the remedy.  
 The aim of the corrective justice account of remedies is to specify 
what it means for the wrong to stand to the remedy as its reason ra-
ther than its condition. Negatively formulated, the fact that consid-
erations of loss allocation do not figure in the definition of the wrong 
entails that they also cannot ground any aspect of the remedy. Posi-
tively formulated, because the defendant’s wrong injures the plaintiff’s 
right, the remedy requires that the defendant restore to the plaintiff 
that right or its equivalent. As set out in Part II, this presupposes 
that the restored right is identical to, limited by, and continuous with 
the right that was injured.    
 On what side of this great divide between reason and condition 
does the Goldberg-Zipursky conception of civil recourse fall? There 
can be no doubt that civil recourse, like corrective justice, falls on the 
reason side. Goldberg and Zipursky would hardly have labored so 
mightily to show that tort law is about wrongs, not loss allocation, if 
they were going to leave open the possibility that loss allocation could 
be readmitted at the recourse stage. This exclusion of loss allocation 
at the recourse stage has to presuppose that the normative consider-
ations relevant to the remedy mirror those relevant to the definition 
of the wrong, that is, that loss allocation does not figure in the remedy 
because it does not figure in the wrong. Thus, as in corrective justice, 
the nature of the wrong determines what counts as redress for the 
wrong.64 If this is the case, then the very conflation of wrong and 
remedy for which they criticize corrective justice is presupposed in 
their own approach. From the corrective justice perspective, this is a 
virtue, not a defect. It allows civil recourse to gain in coherence what 
it loses in distinctiveness.     
 The theoretical mechanics of civil recourse confirm the intimate 
connection of wrong and recourse. Wrong and recourse are linked 
through the requirement of substantive standing, under which a 
claim against the defendant can be asserted only by a person relative 
to whom the defendant’s conduct was wrongful. Goldberg and 
Zipursky insist that the requirement of substantive standing “is inte-
                                                           
 64.   Recall that the reason that Goldberg and Zipursky consider punitive damages that 
aim at deterrence and punishment problematic is that such damages are not oriented to 
redressing the wrong. GOLDBERG & ZIPURSKY, supra note 50, at 355. 
296 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol 39:273 
gral to the definition of tortious wrongdoing.”65 Thus, in their view, 
the availability of a remedy is limited to those whose injury falls 
within the reason for thinking of the defendant’s action as tortious. 
Similarly, they are of the view that the injuries themselves are ac-
tionable only if they, too, come within the reason for thinking of the 
defendant’s action as tortious,66 thereby rejecting the old English ju-
risprudence that distinguished between culpability and compensa-
tion. These controversial views (which are exactly the corrective jus-
tice position)67 show that, in the civil recourse approach, the defini-
tion of the wrong determines who can sue and for what. Moreover, 
Zipursky affirms that “[t]he notion of making whole is . . . a con-
straint, normally, on the extent to which [the] plaintiff may redress 
her wrong. One may not take from the tortfeasor more than one 
needs to make oneself whole. Yet one is entitled to take that much.”68
This sentiment echoes what I previously referred to as the limitation 
thesis in the corrective justice account of remedies; that plaintiffs are 
entitled to the restoration of their injured rights but not to more. The 
consequence is that, even for civil recourse, the wrong determines the 
extent of the plaintiff’s redress.69 Goldberg’s insistence that the rem-
edy “is . . . not built into the very definition of a tort claim”70 pales 
against the role of the wrong in circumscribing who can sue, for what, 
and to what extent.    
 Given the way the theory of civil recourse is constructed, it could 
hardly avoid this integration of wrong and remedy. Adopting Black-
stone’s conception of tort compensation, Goldberg summarizes civil 
recourse as follows: 
In this picture, the basic rights of the individual (e.g., to bodily in-
tegrity) give rise to a right to retaliate against wrongdoers for ac-
tions that constitute wrongings of the victim, which in turn gives 
rise to a legal power to sue the wrongdoer that generates a claim to 
fair compensation.71
This picture sets out a sequence of three notional steps: (1) the 
wrongdoer violates a right of the victim; (2) in the absence of state 
                                                           
 65.   Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 6, at 960. 
 66.   GOLDBERG & ZIPURSKY, supra note 50, at 103-09. 
 67.    Ernest J. Weinrib, The Disintegration of Duty, in EXPLORING TORT LAW 143, 147 
(M. Stuart Madden ed., 2005). 
 68.   Zipursky, Punitive Damages, supra note 47, at 151.  
 69.   The difference is that, for corrective justice the limitation thesis applies categori-
cally, whereas for civil recourse the parallel idea applies “normally” and is therefore subject 
to exceptions. The only exceptions that they mention, however, are thin skulls and punitive 
damages that respond to victimization. Both of these can be explained consistently with 
the idea of making whole. On thin skulls, see Arthur Ripstein, Civil Recourse and Separa-
tion of Wrongs and Remedies, 39 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 163 (2011). On punitive damages, see 
supra Part V. 
 70.   Goldberg, supra note 7, at 468. 
 71.   Id. at 463. 
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institutions the victim is entitled to retaliate for the injury; and (3) 
the victim’s entitlement is transmuted into a legal power to sue the 
wrongdoer. The last two steps are both determined by the first one. 
The legal power of the third step is only to do what the victim is enti-
tled to do, and no more. The transition from retaliation to litigation 
changes the mechanism of recovery, not what can legitimately be re-
covered. The victim’s entitlement at the second step, in turn, is only 
to redress the wrong, and no more.72 Therefore, when the judgment of 
a court replaces the subjectivity of the victim’s redress, the principle 
on which both the court and the victim exercise their powers is lim-
ited by the wrong committed by the wrongdoer at step one. Thus, 
built into the wrong is the limit on what the wrongdoer, acting on his 
own or applying to a court, can legitimately do or claim in response. 
In other words, in this picture the wrong implies a remedy in accord-
ance with corrective justice. As mentioned earlier, corrective justice 
is indeed what Blackstone postulates in observing that the remedy 
restores the right or its equivalent. What Goldberg and Zipursky take 
over from Blackstone’s picture is corrective justice. 
 Academic controversy should not obscure the fact that the differ-
ences between civil recourse and corrective justice, if they exist at all, 
are gossamer thin. When one focuses on what is fundamental to 
the understanding of tort law, it is apparent that civil recourse 
has followed the lead of corrective justice regarding the conceptual-
ization both of the wrong and of its connection to the remedy. To re-
turn to my starting point, the “not” in the title of Zipursky’s article 
Civil Recourse, Not Corrective Justice was certainly not a typo. It 
was, however, a mischaracterization. In its essentials, civil recourse 
is corrective justice.  
                                                           
 72.   The retaliation of this step refers not to action that the victim feels justified in 
taking, but to the action that actually is justified. GOLDBERG & ZIPURSKY, supra note 50, at 354. 
